The Metaphors on International Intervention: A Discourse Analysis of the Sri Lankan English Newspaper Editorials

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Abstract
The metaphors used in the Sri Lankan English newspaper editorials during the peace talk time (2001-2007) commenting on the international intervention in the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict reveal community based ideological and attitudinal positions of the newspapers published in Sri Lanka. Metaphors literally contribute to our understanding of reality. The frames and scripts used for legitimization and de-legitimization of the issues related to international intervention and facilitation in the peace talk, peace process and monitoring the ceasefire bring out certain realities comfortable to certain people, groups or communities. The binary positions projected in the editorial discourse are identified. Discourse constitutes power in constructing ideational, textual and interpersonal constructs which are ideological. It can transmit and even legitimize power in society. During the peace talk time, the editorials are expected to develop constructive discourse on conflict intervention and resolution to make a positive impact on legislative changes but they display ‘ethno-nationalist’ tendencies. The study analyzes whether the media has been a part of the problem or a part of the solution. Since newspaper and editorial discourses are the constructions of journalists and editors of the elites, the biased ideologies are “hidden or subtle in expressions and often revealed in mild forms”. This study takes up selected editorials of the Sri Lankan English newspapers which appeared mainly during the Memorandum of Understanding between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eezham during that period, to relate the discourse themes with rhetorical and metaphorical features.

Keywords: metaphorical discourse analysis, social construction, ethnic conflict, international relations and intervention

1. Introduction
The Sri Lankan ethnic conflict has been going on for more than half a century from 1950s to date. It became an intensive armed struggle in 1980s. In 1987, India intervened between the Tamils and Sinhalese, the two major communities, to resolve the crisis. It failed. Then later from 2001 to 2006, international community consisting USA, EU, Norway, and Japan intervened and it failed. This paper analyses the selected editorials of the Sri Lankan English newspapers on the international intervention and ethnic conflict resolution during the period of Ceasefire Agreement (2002-2006) between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eezham. It traces an ethno-nationalist ideological significance in their editorial construction projecting binary positions in intervention and resolution.

Metaphorical construction of cultural and linguistic nationalism and ethnocentrism is analyzed in the editorial constructs of the Sri Lankan English newspapers. The prevalence of these ideologies in the Sri Lankan texts has been studied and confirmed (Abeysekara, 2002; Balachandren, 1999; Bartholomeusz, 2002; Bartholomeusz et al, 1998; de Silva, 2006; Devotta, 2004a, 2004b, 2007; Dharmadasa, 1992; Gunawardena, 1990; Kearney, 1967; Little, 1994; Manor, 1994; Obeyesekere, 1970; Ponambalam, 1983; Smith, 1978; Tambiah, 1986; Uyangoda, 1996; Wilson, 2000 etc.).

According to Ponambalam (1983) in his book, Sri Lanka: The National Question and the Tamil Liberation struggle, ‘after Sri Lanka gained independence from Great Britain in 1948, discrimination toward Tamils increased through government policies and led to resistance. In the late 1970s, the Tamil militants materialized their armed struggle after non-violent resistance groups failed to raise awareness for their cause’. Thus the present day conflict took a significant national as well as international dimension in Sri Lanka where the Sinhalese fighting to maintain control of Sri Lanka to project a Sinhala identity to the country as a whole and the Tamils fighting for an end to discrimination, for equal representation in political and economic affairs and recognition of their traditional homeland in the Northeast of Sri Lanka.

2. Intervention Background
2.1 Indian Intervention
The interest of the Indian government in Sri Lankan affairs increased from 1983 through 1987. Numerous attempts at mediation between the Sinhalese and the Tamils failed. The impetus for such intervention was most likely the pressure from the many citizens of Tamil Nadu who were related to the Tamils in Sri Lanka. Finally, the Indian government
military intervened in 1987. Negotiations were held, and the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace Accord was signed on July 29, 1987, by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President, Jayewardene. The accord stated that the Indian government would not support a separate Tamil state; however, it did recognize the northern and eastern areas as “areas of historical habitation” of the Tamils (Hennayake, 1989).

This was eventually enacted as the 13th Amendment. Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) established order in the north and east. Consequently, the uprising of the JVP, a socialist movement cum Sinhala nationalists took place in the south against the Indian military presence. Few of the demands agreed to in the Agreement were implemented. When the militants refused to disarm its fighters, the IPKF tried to demobilize them by force and ended up in full-scale conflict with the Tamils. Simultaneously, nationalist sentiment led many Sinhalese to oppose the continued Indian presence. Casualties mounted and eventually India pulled out its troops in March 1990.

### 2.2 International Intervention

The war has caused great damage to the population and economy of the country. In 2001, however, the militants announced a unilateral ceasefire just before Christmas 2001. The new United National Front (UNF) government reciprocated the unilateral ceasefire offer and signed an MOU in February 2002. Norway and other Nordic countries monitored the ceasefire through the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).

The militants temporarily pulled out of the peace talks in 2003, citing lack of attention on an interim political solution. The Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) rejected the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) proposal submitted by the militants for the northeast of the island of Sri Lanka on October 31, 2003. In 2004 the United People Freedom Alliance (UPFA) came to power. The Asian tsunami of late 2004 killed more than 30,000 people in the country. It was hoped that the disaster would bring the warring sides together, but the conflict continued. The militants suggested a Post-Tsunami Operation Mechanism Structure (PTOMS) for rehabilitating the North East victims. But due to the strong opposition from the Sinhala hardliners, and the consequent Supreme Court verdict, it was abandoned.

Gradually the situation became complicated by allegations that both sides violated the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA). In light of this renewed violence that erupted in December 2005, ethnic riots and unsolved murders suspected to have been committed by the military and the militants’ attacks followed. A new crisis, and possibly the resumption of a proper war, emerged in July 2006, resulting in the International Community’s skepticism over resumption of the peace talks. At last the CFA was unilaterally abrogated by the government on 16th January 2008.

### 3. Objective

The basic assumption of the Research Problem is the editorial discourse constructions of journalists and editors of the Sri Lankan elite media “hide or express their ideological and attitudinal positions in subtle and mild forms.” The general objective is:

To investigate the metaphorical construction of the editorial discourse of Sri Lankan English newspapers on the international intervention during 2001-2007 to arrive at the ideological and attitudinal positions and its consequent contribution to the sustainable peace of the country.

The paper investigates how the editorial writers construct social reality and shape public opinion. The existing presuppositions (EP) and propositional attitudes (PA) reveal covert and overt positions of the editorial discourse.

### 4. Theoretical Background

Discourse analysis reveals that “the relations between notions such as ideology, discourse, and text have been more complexly reconceptualized” (Canagarajah, 1999, p.30). In the context of the Sri Lankan press, “discourse is the linguistic realization of the social construct, ideology; the abstract paradigms in discourse are linguistically manifested in text” (ibid.). Lyotard (1984) attacked the grand theories, meta-narratives, and totalities which have shackled the heterogeneity of discourses to impose unitary meaning” (Canagarajah, 1999, p.32).

This study makes use of the frameworks of the Ideological Discourse Analysis (IDA) of Van Dijk and the Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Norman Fairclough for analyzing the media texts. Van Dijk says, “Since newspaper and editorial discourses are the constructions of journalists and editors of the elites, ethno-nationalism is “hidden or subtle in expressions and often revealed in mild forms” (van Dijk, 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). The texts have been often politically analyzed by the political scientists, but not by the linguistic (or discourse) analysts of media discourse in both national and international levels in Sri Lanka.

Chilton and Ilyin (1993), Chilton and Lakoff (1995), Chilton (1996), Chilton and Scaffner (1997), have pointed out the crucial conceptual and semantic role metaphors play in the production of political meaning. Since social and political realities are abstract systems of ideas, metaphor is required in order that they are conceptualised and communicated.

"Metaphor is one important mode of concept formation and argument construction” (Chilton and Ilyin 1993, p.10), argue that:” A new metaphor, or new use of metaphor, can break up the rigid conceptual frames of an existing political order, introducing new options and stimulating political thought and imagination. For instance, accepting a metaphor may also lead to accepting its underlying analogy and its presuppositions (Musolf, 2004, p.150).

The metaphor is a conceptual instrument that enables people to think about situations that are new, complex, and remote. Metaphor creates a common ground or of maintaining contextual continuity and cohesion. Editorial discourse employs metaphors and the cognitive system in use to legitimise the positions of the editorial writers. It persuades giving a distorted picture of metaphors and political discourse, for, “metaphors may communicate something which is difficult to express in literal speech because literal words are lacking” (Gibbs, 1994, p.124; Mio, 1997, p.121); and
“metaphors may help in face-threatening situations in which it is more appropriate to speak about a topic in an indirect way” (Chilton, 1996, p.35).

Metaphorical discourse uses the cognitive and conceptual view of metaphor outlined by Lakoff and Johnson (1980). Metaphors are a means of understanding something in terms of something else by “mapping” one conceptual domain to another. It helps to know what expressions may potentially be understood metaphorically. Metaphors are pervasive in political discourse. There is a difference between rather conventional metaphors and metaphors of discourse construction which occasionally exploit the principles of conceptual mappings. Looking more closely at a generally-negative evaluation of political discourse it becomes apparent that political writing, which Orwell criticises, also uses stale metaphors, similes, and idioms: “you save much mental effort, at the cost of leaving your meaning vague, not only for your reader but for yourself” (Orwell 1968, p.134).

The issue of a metaphor’s effectiveness in persuading an audience has not been uncontested. Psychological studies support the hypothesis of the advantage of metaphor over literal language, such as Sopory’s and Dillard’s (2002) meta-analysis of 24 empirical studies shows. Moreover, changes in social practices may produce new discursive challenges which demand creative response (Fairclough, 1989, pp.169-196). It shows its creativity in metaphorical political discourse necessary to ensure political survival.

Scripts as defined by Schank (1998, p.7-9) are a set of expectations about what will happen next in a well known way. Scripts are useful for a variety of reasons. They make clear what is supposed to happen, and what various acts on the parts of others are supposed to indicate. They also make mental processing easier by allowing us to think less. Werth (1999, p.43) defines the concept of frame, developed by Fillmore (1982) as: "A frame is a sort of "experiential space"...frames represent the distilled experiences of the individual and the speech community centering on specific linguistic expressions. A linguistic expression such as a word...will evoke the whole range of experience which that item is normally involved in"(p.71). In the present study, both scripts and frames are useful to categorise/label the cognitive system used to link past experiences with the event, tracing ideological continuity.

5. Research Methodology

Metaphorical Discourse Analysis is useful in analyzing the ways of social construction in editorial discourse using the methods of Social Constructionist Approach (SCA) and Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). The Table given below gives the detail of the Sri Lankan English Newspaper editorials (2001-2007) selected for the study.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Names of the dailies &amp; weeklies</th>
<th>Abbreviated forms (for the analysis)</th>
<th>Proprietors and publications</th>
<th>Number of editorials</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Daily News and The Sunday Observer</td>
<td>News: DN &amp; SO</td>
<td>Lake House (Government)</td>
<td>397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Island and The Sunday Island</td>
<td>Island: IS &amp; SI</td>
<td>Upali Newspapers Ltd. (Private)</td>
<td>440</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Daily Mirror and The Sunday Times</td>
<td>Times: DM &amp; ST</td>
<td>Wijeya Newspapers Ltd. (Private)</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Morning Leader and The Sunday Leader</td>
<td>Leader: ML &amp; SL</td>
<td>Leader Publications Ltd. (Private)</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1249</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The Primary Survey

6. Analysis of Metaphorical Construction

6.1 The Scripts/Frames of Intervention as a Powerful and Paternalist force

The international intervention is seen as the powerful forces giving pressure to the government. The metaphorical references look at this situation negatively, for instance, “Uncle Sam” and “global headman” (The Island, 24 August 2006, editorial, p.8) referring metonymically the U.S.A and “The road to hell” to the Northeast situation to give emphasis to the arguments. The International Community takes the role of the judge and punishes the criminal: “the world powers are on a crusade to democratise the world” (The Island, 12 January 2005, editorial, p. 8).

The media appreciate when the International Community acts against the extremists and Tamil Diaspora internationally and criticize when the International Community intervenes in the ethnic conflict resolution and insists on refraining from the military approach. The editorials supported the governments and International Community in resolving the conflicts militarily or with the minimum solution which will not affect the majoritarian nationalist interests; they oppose when the International Community supports the minorities to win their political rights or maximum devolution. The media appreciate when the international non-governmental organizations assist mainly the South in economic development and humanitarian services and when the international community criticizes only the Tamil nationalists.

The Island, (20 February 2003, editorial, p.8) in its editorial on “the importance of foreigners” was ‘furious’ that “those who speak about foreign interference and subservience to foreigners are dismissed as ‘Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinists’, frogs-in-the-well etc”. It ridicules that “the most venerated of the species of foreigners amongst us today is the
"International Peace Monitors". "Norway has at various times been perceived by Sinhala nationalist groups as being "pro-Tamil" because of the small but vocal Tamil diaspora in the country" (Goodhand et. al, 2005, editorial, p.40).

In the editorial, “Blake, Blake burning bright! You’ve got the Tiger right!” the newly-appointed USA ambassador, Robert Blake, is praised for his warning to the LTTE:

On Tuesday, we had a different Blake speaking of a different Tiger in an entirely different way. It was not about the animal's 'fearful symmetry' or the 'distant deeps or skies' burning the fire of its eyes. The new US Ambassador to Sri Lanka Robert O. Blake, putting his diplomatic finger on what really ails Sri Lanka’s peace process, told the press in Colombo that the Tigers were not willing to give up violence. He hit the nail on the head, slap-bang! (The Island, 21 September 2006, editorial, p.8)

However, to the LTTE, “Co-chairs as a scarecrow” (The Island, 09 January 2006, editorial, p.8) - something that looks frightening but not dangerous. Therefore, they should have “a stick and stick approach”:

The Co-chairs who met in Tokyo the other day have said they will have a carrot-and-stick approach to restarting Sri Lanka’s stalled peace talks. We thought they would come out with something innovative at their much flaunted meeting. They are apparently on a wild goose chase: India was the first to experiment with it years ago. It used the carrot on the LTTE, the monster it created and the stick on the JRJ government, which had ruffled its geopolitical feathers. A forced marriage was arranged and the outcome was the birth of a nobody’s baby—Provincial Councils. The Tigers refused to have any more carrots and returned to flesh eating. Then the stick was used generously on them as well but to no avail. The rest is history and we have been holding the ‘baby’ ever since! Today, India talks of neither carrots nor sticks.

So, the Co-chairs must adopt a new approach; a stick-and-stick approach. The party that violates the truce—be it the government or the LTTE—and slaps roadblocks on the path to peace should be belaboured with a stick to be specially designed, until the culprit falls in line (The Island, 01 June 2006, editorial, p.8)

The International Community is “running the peace process” as a business. (The Sunday Times, 04 September 2005, editorial, p.12) The ‘international community’ (within quotation) is obsessed with the pain of the unresolved conflict and expresses, “the international euphoria” (The Sunday Leader, 05 December 2004, editorial, p.12). Among the ‘much euphoria resulted among the “international community”’ (The Island, 27 May 2004, p.8) there are “a handful of swashbuckling nations by virtue of their military might enhanced by their nuclear weapons, controlling the destiny of the world” (The Island, 09 October 2006, editorial, p.8). On hearing the LTTE’s interim proposals, the White world thinks that resolving the crisis is the White man’s burden. It goes even a step further and regards the peace process as a trap: “an international conspiracy to capture them in a honey trap”: (The Sunday Times, 07 September 2003, editorial, p.12)

Unfortunately, Sri Lanka is burdened with a set of invertebrate leaders who would shamelessly cringe and crawl before foreign powers and stop at nothing.

(The pro-interventionists) want to create an environment for their foreign bosses to control the country in a bigger way and to facilitate the separatist campaign to cut the Sri Lankan melon (The Island, 25 August 2006, editorial, p.8).

The editorials always criticize the internationalization of the conflict but encourage even the LTTE to participate in the meeting when the International Community pledges financial assistance. The International Community is represented as parties interested to solve the crisis: “Yesterday's statement by the US Government, come close on the heels of one by the EU” (The Daily News, 21 August 2004, editorial, p.8). The International Community is the insurer for the losses due to the ill-effects of the peace process and their participation is asserted as an enhancement: “it should also underwrite any agreement reached”; “guarantee the observance of a mutually agreed formal joint ceasefire”; “enhance the chances of minimizing any breaches of the ceasefire.” (The Daily News, 05 February 2002, editorial, p.8). Achieving peace in this context has become a chance for survival given to them.

The wide use of "We" in the editorials expresses the ideology of consensus (Fowler 1991, p.49) with which the discourse is being identified. The order of identification is suggestive. A division was constructed between the USA and the European Union with regard to the ban on the LTTE in the West. In hierarchical terms, the US, contrary to India, was expected to play important role in the war and not in the peace process. An attack is always there on their intervention in the political process. This attack often assumes the metaphor of a father and his responsibility towards his children, suggesting its inability to act like an adult, which has resulted in the present situation (the Frame of Whitman’s Burden).

Fairclough (1995b, p.95) points out the use of a similar authoritarian family discourses in the British Press, criticizing the action taken against Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. The editorials used the same conceptual framework and maintained both opinion coherence and pre-existing polarization in the context of the conflict. The whole event was placed on the script of War on Terrorism. This metaphor corresponds with the Law and order sub-classification of the
The Norwegian role in Sri Lanka's peace bid is meanwhile under the microscope, The Norwegian negotiators are continuously monitored and are seen accountable for the Ceasefire/Human Rights

The nation’s capital is quite often substituted for the government as found in the expression, “but Oslo's hope is that” (The Sunday Times, 04 September 2005, editorial, p.12); and sometimes for the name of the country or the bureaucrats who are in power. China is hailed as the “big brother who has come to our aid especially when the chips were down, and no one (other than Pakistan) helped Sri Lanka when the Northern insurgency broke out.” (The Sunday Times, 10 August 2003, editorial, p.12)

6.2 The Scripts/Frames of the Intervention as inappropriate intrusion

The editors generally exhibits the intervention in interference frame and the dictatorship frame (“susurped”, “pressured”, “warned” etc.), accounting for the action of the International Community to sidestep the United Nations. They have negative connotations for the Sri Lankan people. Highlighting their illegal nature and their action in an emotional schema helps (van Dijk 1988a) the readers both to remember and link it with past experiences.

The readers inter-textually link with the texts of the international Press on similar crisis. The editorial treats the JVP, a Sinhala Nationalist Party as the family members and regards Sri Lanka’s attempts at sending away the invited guests, the Norwegians: “showing them the door too” (The Sunday Leader, 05 December 2004, editorial, p.12); “Doomed are the peace makers!” (The Island, 14 August 2006, editorial, p.8). This is mainly because of the fact that the Norwegians, according to the editorial, are aliens and are ignorant of the conflict, the activities of the LTTE and their human rights violations in the Wanni region: “the cool salubrious climes of the North Pole” (Norway) versus “the hot impenetrable jungles of the Wanni” and “the Scandinavian monitors appear to have gone to sleep” (The Island, 23 February 2002, editorial, p.8). However, “the Norwegians cannot be blamed because the UNP government and now the UPFA government have given a free rein to the Norwegians to interfere in our internal affairs” (The Island, 17 January 2005, editorial, p.8). The Co-chairs are only “preachers pouring water on a duck’s back. Nobody seems to pay heed to their preaching but they go on pontificating” (The Island, 24 November 2006, editorial, p.8).

That their approaches are accused as groundless and blind is presupposed: “the actors in this tragi-comedy, the LTTE, government, opposition, Norwegians and Indians are still poles apart in their thinking with no common ground in sight” (The Sunday Leader, 24 August 2003, editorial, p.12). The dignitaries visiting the LTTE are ironically described as, “pilgrims of peace” (The Island, 17 January 2005, editorial, p.8). This is not the case with the India’s intervention because “our Johnnies- come- lately into foreign affairs insisted on India’s presence, only to eat their own words” (The Island, 22 January 2003, editorial, p.8). The editorial is conclusive about the powerlessness of the International Community to bring the LTTE to negotiation:

Where are the Americans, the Japanese, the Vikings, the British and other Europeans—the knights on a mission to slay the dragon of terror? Look for them ‘not here’ ‘not there’ and oh, here they are in a corner, covering their faces in shame! Yes, the brave dragon slayers have reason to be ashamed. Despite their bragging and sabre rattling, they cannot even tame a Tiger (The Island, 22 April 2006, editorial, p.8)

So, even if Mr. Akashi had been able to have a private audience with the LTTE leader, he wouldn’t have achieved anything by way of taking the peace process forward. With the Tigers, he may talk the hind legs off a donkey till the cows come home but still return to Tokyo via Colombo without any positive results. Many before him tried to achieve peace in a similar manner only to realise in the end that they all had been barking up the wrong tree (The Island, 09 May 2006, editorial, p.8).

It is time that a whip is cracked on the Tigers as the Canadians did. If not, the LTTE will regard this weakness as a blank cheque to continue to do as they please (The Island, 23 April 2006, editorial, p.8).

Japan is warned of the attempts to destroy the basic amenities of the people: “Japan should proceed very carefully on this Sri Lankan issue without treading on the corns of the people” (The Island, 22 January 2003, editorial, p.8) because, “There are already too many cooks involved in preparing this Peace Soup. As the Sri Lankan variant of ‘Too many cooks’ goes... Too many cooks.... soup, soup, soup!” (ibid.)

However, scholars of the International Relations justify the intervention. They provided “different elements of the safety net - the U.S. and India providing security guarantees, Norway mediation, Japan funding, etc.” (Goodhand et al., 2005) because, they identify “asymmetry in negotiations tends to favor the government”. The government can access them but they are “not available to guerrilla groups”. This situation pressured the Tamil militants in their dealings with the International Community to search for legitimacy and political parity with the Government”.

The Norwegian negotiators are continuously monitored and are seen accountable for the Ceasefire/Human Rights violations committed by the parties: “the Norwegian role in Sri Lanka's peace bid is meanwhile under the microscope, aggravated by the murder of this country's foreign minister three weeks ago. The Norwegians must be held to account for this assassination” (The Sunday Times, 04 September 2005, editorial, p.12). The Norwegians are blamed for their not able to control the violations as fish trapped on the hook: “but Oslo's hope is that the Sri Lankans' infamous ability
to forgive and forget, will get them off the hook” (ibid.); “they wash their hands off the matter” (The Island, 11 April 2005, editorial, p.8). Monitors are as “King Kekille known for his downright stupidity and absurd judgments. That bovine king, like the present day monitors, would let the culprits hauled up before him off the hook and punish a third party” because “they called for the government to disarm the so-called paramilitary groups” (The Island, 16 January 2006, editorial, p.8). The SLMM are engaged in “Sisyphean task” to bring the LTTE into the fold (The Island, 30 May 2006, editorial, p.8)– in Greek mythology, a cruel king of Corinth who was condemned for eternity to roll a boulder up the hill only to have it roll down again just before it reached the top. The editorial titled as “Exchanging the devil for the rascal?” (Rhetorical question) (The Sunday Times, 04 September 2005, editorial, p.12) regards even the rumored “UN intervention” as far worse than Norwegian one.

The Norwegians and SLMM are alleged as stealthy cats “pussyfooting on the peace process” (The Sunday Times, 04 September 2005, editorial, p.12) and “darlings of the so-called international community” (The Island, 11 April 2005, editorial, p.8). They are like teachers, who “impart lessons to the Sri Lankan media on ‘responsible journalism’”; they take “swipes at the media and the critics of the terrorists”, but “do not contain the LTTE which poses a threat not only to the peace process but also to their very lives” (ibid.). The approaches of the International Community are criticized as slanted, unreliable and distorted: “Mr. Harrold’s skewed logic and we know Mr. Harrold, we are asking too much from a person like you” (The Island, 07 March 2005, editorial, p.8). When the EU banned the LTTE, Mr. Bauer, the Norwegian diplomat, commented that it would obstruct the ongoing peace process. So he was compared to “King Kekille”:

Incidentally, Mr. Bauer’s swipe at the EU may evoke one’s memories of that legendary king known for his bovine judgments—Kekille. He always set the guilty party free and hang the innocent. It looks as if we were not without descendants of King Kekille, at least in far away Norway (The Island, 22 August 2006, editorial, p.8).

The SLMM/Norwegian facilitation is criticized as a disabled, “practically paralysed” (The Sunday Leader, 02 July 2006, editorial, p.12). Whenever the LTTE launches violence, the SLMM does not blame just the LTTE but the “ghosts” (The Island, 10 January 2006, editorial, p.8); “the Vikings appear to be a possessed lot. Wherever they go, they see ghosts” (The Island, 12 June 2006, editorial, p.8). The powerful and active West is personified as a sleeping, inactive person: “The West Must Wake Up” (The Daily News, 07 January 2006, editorial, p.8):

a scarecrow with an old clay pot for the head and that it can do anything and get away with it; no reaction from the Co-Chairs, except for some diplomatic mumbo-jumbo; but the scarecrow looks on with nary a nod of its much hallowed hollow head. (The Island, 09 January 2006, editorial, p.8)

But, successful peace processes depend upon strong inter-personal relationships between protagonists and mediators (Goodhand et. al, 2005, p.31). The LTTE is “allowed to go hell for leather to thrust war on the other”, “compliments and praise sans action to rein in the Tigers smack of a hidden agenda and a sinister move to sweet-talk the government into giving in to the LTTE”; “other than helping rein in the Tigers and making them amenable, the Co-chairs to spell out” (The Island, 09 January 2006, editorial, p.8). “The world-view and organizational culture of guerrilla organizations” has to be distinguished from “those of states”. The intervention “involved building long-term, trusting relationships with key individuals” (Goodhand et. al, 2005, p.31). They say that “the precarious balance of political forces in the South” did not permit such mediation and faces criticism:

Negotiations are, no doubt, the best way to settle a dispute but forcing a legitimate state to subjugate its sovereignty to talks with an intrinsigent terror outfit without providing any safeguards is tantamount to the strangulation of democracy. Or, it is like throwing a cove into a Tiger’s cage for mating purposes. The history of peace making in this country has been a long drawn process of throwing a countless number ewes to the Tigers one after the other (The Island, 15 November 2006, editorial, p.8).

The call for intervention is interpreted as lack of vision: “President Chandrika Bandaranayake Kumaratunghe’s call for the United Nations to get more involved in the peace process here comes as a shot in the dark” (The Sunday Times, 04 September 2005, editorial, p.12). Postponing the conflict resolution is seen as far better than intervention: “internationalizing of what is essentially still a domestic dispute” and “the best is that the peace process be on cold storage now” (ibid.). After Mahinda Rajapakse became the President, “the people were given the impression that the meddlesome Vikings would be given a thundering kick each in their posterior and sent running whence they had come” (The Island, 11 March 2006, editorial, p.8). The financial intervention in the Northeast is construed as an attempt at rebuilding the pro-Tamil activities of the International Community are seen as shedding light on its intrigue with the LTTE:

(The LTTE) may have oiled many foreign palms during the past few decades. With a great deal of funds at its disposal, it is certainly in a position to offer any foreign official a bribe that he or she cannot refuse. The UN should follow suit, as there are said to be some white skinned closet Tigers in its offices here (The Island, 24 August 2006, editorial, p.8).
The pro-Tamil activities of the International Community are hated as the activities of real tigers. The rehabilitation activities in the Northeast by international agencies are called as the LTTE intruded ones. Allowing the International Non-governmental Organizations and the International Community to intervene in the conflict under the pretext of rehabilitation means “bartering away sovereignty for a mess of pottage” (The Island, 05 April 2005, editorial, p.8). The editorial argues that while the culture of LTTE is the culture of violence, the culture of the International Community/international aid agencies is the culture of mercenary: “(LTTE) is an organisation that’s driven by a culture of guns as opposed to a mercenary one that the lending institutions and donors are wedded to” (The Sunday Times, 07 September 2003, editorial, p.12).

The International Community is seen as adding flavor to the conflict resolution cooking and as bidders in the auction: “in a bid to give a special UN flavour to the Sri Lankan peace process” and “the Norwegian role in Sri Lanka's peace bid” (The Sunday Times, 04 September 2005, editorial, p.12). The International Community and Aid agencies are criticized as “the development wizards” (The Sunday Times, 07 September 2003, editorial, p.12) who are supposed to have magical powers and their promises are just a mirage: “a mirage built on the illusory promises of the World Bank” (ibid.).

This type was cued in the frequent lexical chunk "refugee exodus", which by having the Jewish exodus from Egypt as a source, highlighted the ordeals of both the Tamil and Muslim communities. The editorials argue that these situations strengthened the "holy" character of the decision to intervene. Instances where the Tamil struggle was characterized as evil, demon were also included in this category. The International Community are named as saviors in a biblical sense: “as saviors of world economies” (ibid.). The economy is portrayed as “shambles”, and the assistance of the International Community is a trade off for peace (The Island, 23 February 2002, editorial, p.8).

6.3 The Scripts/Frames of the Intervention as aids, guaranty and insurance

These scripts cue in "courtroom" lexis (murder, guilty etc.) and mostly refer to Prapakaran, the leader of the LTTE, as well as the Tamil militant movements. This comes to legitimize the ‘war against terrorism’ in Sri Lanka. The pro-UNP (the United National Party) media refer them to the SLFP (Sri Lanka Freedom Party), JVP (Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna), and JHU (Jathika Hela Urumaya) parties and leaders. Metaphorical construction exploits the social aspect of the conflict. It is “a creative co-production by the readership” when political metaphors develop lives of their own (Chilton, 1996, pp.251-402). Media and politics are engaged in a collaborative interpretation of traditional metaphors by extending it. Some political metaphors seem to have a “poetic effect” in the sense that they trigger very rich interpretations by opening a wide range of “weak implicatures” (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, pp.202-237).

The situation is “closely monitored by friendly countries” (The Daily News, 17 Feb. 2003); “Sri Lanka and Sri Lankans” have “many friends and well-wishers in the global arena who desire to help our country emerge successfully out of the worst crisis to plague our society in centuries” (The Sunday Observer, 24 Nov. 2002). But this had happened only when they are pro-government or pro-Sinhalese: “a few of Sri Lanka’s closest friends” and “Our close friends in the international community” (The Daily News, 08 Dec. 2005). “The international safety net to strengthen the peace process” is termed as slogans to identify a company or its goals and as an advertising catchy phrase:

The "international safety net" is his (Ranil Wickramasinghe, the leader of the Opposition Party, the UNP) ongoing slogan, and its the same track on which he pursued the peace process having talks with the LTTE through Norwegian facilitation with the global community keeping sentinel. During his tenure as Head of Government, he used the ‘ international safety net ’ to egg Norway on through the US (The Sunday Times, 04 Sept. 2005).

The intervention is named as the sentry (ibid.). The international relations is looked at as the pressure of the International Community on the LTTE: “the Government has urged the international community to exert maximum pressure on the LTTE to desist from such attacks” (The Daily News, 08 Dec. 2005); “to pressure the outfit to open up their ‘unofficial state’” (The Island, 07 March 2005). The International Community is given the job of controlling only the LTTE not the Sri Lankan Security Forces:

No fruitful session of talks could take place amid booming guns and exploding bombs. These weapons of violence have to be silenced and hostilities have to be suspended if the proposed talks are to produce the desired results. There should also be a solid guarantee against any attempt by the LTTE to reinforce its military capability during talks. (The Daily Mirror, 14 Sep. 2006)
The US support is praised as the model for democratic practice: “substantially boosted”; “should further energise the State’s search”; “unflagging zeal”; “a vital segment of democratic opinion in the West is unambiguously siding with it”; “being synonymous with democratic vibrancy”; “this citadel of representative governance in the West”; “this positive opinion”; “a substantial segment of global opinion” (The Daily News, 07 Jan. 2006). The development assistance is named as “bonanza” for building the state unto them (The Island, 27 May, 2004). The Northeast is usually described as battered and impoverished areas, which threaten to pull in the development aid to the country:

The view of the Japanese is that there must be peace before they pump in the buckshee for the development of this country. The World Bank is now echoing, (though it’s not a new song ) the view of the Japanese that there must be peace in the country before they pump in the dollars or the yen and the kromers to develop it, especially in the battered and impoverished areas of the North and the East. (The Sunday Times, 07 Sept. 2003)

It resists the World Bank and Japan’s precondition of peace. There is a conflict of reasoning. Though it accepts the Northeast as “battered and impoverished”, it belittles the situation in giving priority to the norm of “money first, peace later”. It accuses the international aid institutions as the echoes of the International Community. It can change and impact the attitudes of the Sinhala Majority Community to be positive. The International Community should take “the risk of throwing some good money down the river in the greater cause of the pursuit of democracy and the rule of law in a nation” (The Sunday Times, 07 Sept. 2003). Development is, insisted here as, the real solution, not a political one:

Japanese envoy Yashushi Akashi learnt (Learner Frame) that the LTTE did not buy that line themselves (Traping Frame). The reason being, that over the decades, these billions have not filtered (Filter Frame) to the ordinary people, and this mess of portage (Too many cooks-cooking-the soup Frame) mean nothing really to the ordinary folk of the north or south. On the other hand, had the co-chairs invested some of these funds into the country (Topicalization), including the war-ravaged north and east (Secondary Position), and put their money where their mouth is, the people of the north and east would have accrued some tangible benefits (Apparent Compassion & Altruism Moves), and acted as a red-rag to the war-mongering LTTE leadership, whose clearly unreasonable demand of ISGA (Interim Self-governing Authority), and nothing but ISGA, seems to have escaped the co-chairs' wrath for the log-jam. In this Christmas season, all we can pray for is ‘God save Sri Lanka’. (The Sunday Times, 26 Dec. 2004)

6.4 The scripts/Frames of the India’s intervention as invasion

Half a century old history of the conflict is placed in a wider "regional security and pan-Tamil Eelam tendency" schema. The lexicalization includes India in countering the LTTE, highlighting the nexus between Tamil Nadu and the Northeast of Sri Lanka and the ethnic similarities that led to the support for the struggle. By placing this war on these "chronicles", its nature and THEIR qualities have been highlighted in terms of their historic continuation. India’s reluctance to send military assistance and ground troops is illuminated within a wider terrorist script.

The danger to the personified India’s security (reminiscent of the Cold War era), has now become not China or the US, but "terrorist organizations in the South Asia". By assigning the militant organizations the role of a gangster and exposing their illegal character, the discourse implies the need for "policing". They are "inside" India and this "policing" is for the regional stability: “as the LTTE evolved, they turned closer home, to India, for their training and funding, going on to master the art of the suicide bomber" (Neighborhood House script) (The Sunday Times, 07 Sept. 2003)

The choice of Norway, its low key and limited agenda made sense in several respects. First, Norway was seen as an acceptable, non-threatening mediator (Goodhand et. al, 2005, p.23)

Of course, (Inter-personal expression) who plays what role is essentially a concern of Sri Lanka, if we still do consider our country to be a sovereign, independent republic but in recent years our foreign policy has been to crawl on all fours to New Delhi, even on issues that do not concern India’s security. And with this ‘Peace Process’; Madame Lanka has become everybody’s darling in the bazaar – anybody who has currency in his pocket being welcome (The Island, 22 Jan. 2003)

It regards India’s interference as hegemonic and self-interested. Sri Lanka is portrayed as subservient to India and as a prostitute to the International Community and India:

Minister of Tourism Anura Bandaranaike has told Indian High Commissioner to Sri Lanka Nirupama Rao a home truth. He has asked her in plain English to mind her own business without getting too big for her slippers. He has reminded her of the bitter experience of J. N. Dixit, who had hubris and chutzpah oozing from every diplomatic pore of his (The Island, 08 Sep. 2006).

The conflict is made into a spectacle and India’s intervention is described as causing pain to the Sri Lankans (ibid.); Indian policies and interventions are seen as flawed. The international relations is shown as problematic and antagonistic but “the hatchet was buried”:
Sri Lanka's relationship with India seems to have come a full circle. Last week, New Delhi hysterically drew attention to the Sea Tigers and the LTTE's burgeoning air force. New Delhi was, we were told, "concerned."

Ah, what short memories those Machiavellian marvels in Delhi have. They have conveniently forgotten how it was that from 1977 to 1987 India's notorious Research and Analysis Wing trained by the KGB, wreaked havoc in Sri Lanka by training, arming and harbouring LTTE cadres in South India. (The Sunday Leader, 15 May, 2005)

According to the editorial, India's approach is unstable and disastrous. The LTTE air force is amplified as a threat to India. The Indian authorities choose to forget the way they served as patrons to the Tamil militants. India's realization of the LTTE's excess is criticized as too late and absurd: "it was only after the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 that India finally thought the LTTE had gone too far"; for "India now to lament that the Tigers have got rather above themselves is both hypocritical and puerile and the disastrous 13th Amendment and the disastrous provincial councils system"; "Delhi has begun grumbling about the prowess of the Sea Tigers and the rebels' incipient air force"; "it is past time that India's perfidy should be exposed but in the past, its relations with the Tamil militants are the shows of bonhomie and camaraderie"; "to keep an ace up their sleeve to make sure they can turn on the tap of violence when the fancy takes them"; "Rajiv Gandhi and his viceroy in Colombo, Mani Dixit, had Sri Lanka dancing to their tune"; "New Delhi changes its ways. Like a scorpion, all it knows to do is sting" (ibid.). However, the media has always suppressed the historical event of the attack of a Sinhala Soldier on Rajiv Gandhi and the Soldier's popularity among the Sinhala community for having done so.

The Research Analysis Wing (RAW) is accused as notorious and "continued to play ducks and drakes"; "RAW is so anxious to finance the JVP". The Tamil militants "were RAW's loyal henchmen, largely financed by the Indian taxpayer". India's intervention in 1987's is seen as an invasion: India "intervened, demanding threatened to invade"; "launched"; "entered Sri Lanka's territorial waters illegally and by force"; "in a blatant act of war, Indian Air Force fighters and bombers invaded Sri Lankan airspace and over-flew Jaffna"; "a naked display of power intended to cow the Colombo government into submission". That the Tamils welcoming India is falsified as "the cheers of LTTE cadres lining the streets of Jaffna, strewing flowers in their path" (The Sunday Leader, 15 May, 2005). Thus it suppresses the fact that it was only the Sinhalese who were against the Indian intervention but India is always evasive: "New Delhi clearly hit the ball into our court" (The Daily Mirror, 06 May, 2004).

In a sarcastic tone, India is called as mother: "Sri Lanka has come a full circle in its relationship with Mother India. "Some mother!" you may say, but the fact 'remains that we have to learn to live with India". The caring mother India becomes an object of danger: "Mother India might threaten, cajole and bribe politicians into submission, but it is time that India's perfidy should be exposed but in the past, its relations with the Tamil militants are the shows of bonhomie and camaraderie"; "to keep an ace up their sleeve to make sure they can turn on the tap of violence when the fancy takes them"; "Rajiv Gandhi and his viceroy in Colombo, Mani Dixit, had Sri Lanka dancing to their tune"; "New Delhi changes its ways. Like a scorpion, all it knows to do is sting" (ibid.). India is blamed as the paternalist to the Tamil insurrection "having kick-started the entire insurrection has done the Indian rope trick and washed their hands off". The international relations are criticized as unreliable, tricky and evasive: "Their priorities today are not in the Wanni and other remote places but the Washington defence establishment to play nuclear games". (The Sunday Leader, 02 July, 2006). India, it says, has no moral right to advise Sri Lanka on the resolution and human rights issues:

Once a father blew a gasket on seeing a report card his son brought him after a school test. It had single digits against most subjects. "Is this how you are faring? You are a complete failure. Shame on you!" the exasperated father yelled. "No, dad, that’s not mine. It’s one of your old reports I managed to dig out," said the son, handing over his own report (which was no better than the big man’s). Moral: Failures must be wary of faulting other failures! India is behaving like that father and Sri Lanka like the son. Crabs that move sideways, it is said, want their young ones to walk straight! (The Island, 27 Nov. 2006)

The traditional homeland of the Tamils was recognized by the merger of the North and the East by the Indo-Lanka Agreement 1987. Later it was declared as null and void by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka in 2006. It was regarded as a "merger most foul":

The real tragedy is not so much the made-in-India merger, which JRJ carried out under duress but the fact that it had been taken for granted for so long in spite of the public knowledge that it was illegal. Later the merger became a sort of holy cow which no one wished to touch (The Island, 17 Oct. 2006)

The merger itself, as freely acknowledged, was forced down the country’s throat by India which having created the LTTE monster sought to defang it somewhat through the Indo–Sri Lanka Agreement of 1987. The long touted Tamil ‘homeland’ theory has been effectively and conclusively demolished and it is not necessary to re-tread that path all over again for the purposes of this commentary. It is “the hot potato” (The Island, 22 Oct. 2006).

The metaphor found in the U.S as a World policeman (Chilton and Lakoff 1995, p.42) is transferred to India, which is seen as a regional policeman. The justification of the ‘policing’ is given, in the presence of “criminals like the LTTE”. Attributing criminal characteristics to the LTTE comes to suggest the causes of the war and maintains a polarisation of
‘good’ and ‘bad’, thus strengthening the need for ‘policing’ or it is put in another law and order frame. The Sunday Times, The Daily News and The Island always comment on “India’s policies and pressures” on the ethnic conflict and peace process and its “continued support and neutrality” at present. They always advocate “friendship with India” but with caution.

The media reflects the prejudice that “India consisting a sixty-five millions of Tamils is always supportive to the Sri Lankan Tamils”. The Sri Lankan Tamils are the settlers and invaders from South India and during the last two thousand years of Sri Lankan history. The suspicion towards Tamils is extended to the Indians in general. So, there is always alertness at any Indian involvement in Sri Lanka. Col. R Hariharan, a retired Indian Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90, associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies describes the Sinhalese obsession with the Tamils:

“The bestial acts” of the ‘Sinhala goondas’ during the ethnic riot in 1983 are compared equally with ‘the monsterization of India’ and ‘the terrorization of the Tamil militants,’ so that the intensive effect of the former is lessened. Now it is the Tamil problem.”

(Hariharan, 2008)

The editorial always 're-contextualize' the theme of terrorism making the Tamil militants as the only agents of violence.

Terrorism is like water, which takes the shape of the vessel it is in. The reason why the world has failed to remove the scourge of terror is that the world powers have got distracted by the labels of their own making. This has led to the emergence of two types of terrorists—‘their terrorists’ and ‘our terrorists’.

Some have sought to explain the double standards on the part of the world leaders. Those who are wars for the global war on terror are driven not by their desire to rid the world of terrorism or their concern for Christianity but by their thirst for oil as well as other politico-economic interests (The Island, 29 Sep. 2006).

“The Tamil Problem’ can be resolved through discussions and negotiations in a civilised manner with any government.” The Island, (07 Dec. 2004) pointing out the failure, says: “some Tamils complain that these problems have remained for decades and nothing been done about them and certainly there are many problems to be resolved which have dragged on over decades” but “in other quarters Tamils enjoy even greater rights than the Sinhalese such as the freedom to live freely in any part of the country enjoying their rights although no Sinhalese or Muslim could do so in the Northern Province” (Apparent contrast Move). However, Hariharan, (2008) distinguishes the effects from the causes:

“President Rajapaksa’s government has repeatedly given an impression that once the LTTE is vanquished it would be all smooth sailing with the Tamil population automatically joining the democratic mainstream. It appears to identify the LTTE as the problem, rather than as the manifestation of the problem.”

The North and East of the island have been claimed as the traditional homeland by the Tamil-speaking community. The territoriality of the Tamil and the Sinhala communities has instilled the idea of cultural nationalism and ethno-nationalism in contrast to statist nationalism. (i) on 16th October, 2006, in a judgment that could have far-reaching consequence, the Sri Lankan Supreme Court declared as illegal the merger of the Northern and Eastern Provinces to form a single Tamil-dominated North-Eastern Province as the place of “historical habitation” Gans, (2003) of the Tamils (Ponnambalm, 1983) (ii) on 14 May 2007, the SLFP government formally declared that Sri Lanka to be a “unitary state” instead of the International Community- advocated ‘federal state’. In parallel to the Tamils claim of the Northeast as their traditional homeland, the Sinhalese make a counterclaim of the whole island as their traditional homeland. The Daily Mirror (19 Oct. 2006) applauds the Supreme Court judgement on the de-merger as “path-breaking”. The political campaign of the Sinhala nationalists is seen as “persistent”. It is a “legal remedy” to the ill-treatment or infected disease of the Sinhala community, “the merger of the Northern and Eastern provinces” which was “illegal”. It constructs an emotional attachment to this verdict as it is “to their heart’s content”. The editorial resistance is transferred as the judicial resistance. “Twenty years after”, taken from The Island dated 24th of July, 2003 has this to say:

Whatever the causes that led to these shameful incidents, the bestial acts that were committed on innocent citizens of this country cannot be excused. It was a time when India for the first time appeared in the form of a monster attempting to gobble up this little island (Binary: Aggressors versus Victims).

“The bestial acts” of the ‘Sinhala goondas’ during the ethnic riot in 1983 are compared equally with ‘the monsterization of India’ and ‘the terrorization of the Tamil militants,’ so that the intensive effect of the former is lessened. Now it is the Sri Lanka which was the victim. The demonization frame is evoked in the nature of beast positioned against monster which is far worse.
7. Findings and Discussion

In Sri Lankan context, the discourse themes help the construction of binary positions, through the use of US and THEM. According to van Dijk (1991, p.13), the term ‘THEM’ refers to deviance and threats, viz., threats to OUR country, space, population composition, and ethnic representation in political power, employment, education etc. It recognizes the concerns of dominant group, their prejudices, group norms and goals, as well as dominant ideologies. He says that ethnic minorities are linked to the prominence and availability of the overall social cognitions such as (a) Socio-cultural difference and lack of adjustment and tolerance; (b) Deviance of established (dominant) norms (including terrorism, violence and crime); (c) Competition for scarce resources (educational, economic and natural resources).

Johnson’s (2005) project titled as Proposition 203: A Critical Metaphor Analysis draws on Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980) work with metaphor analysis to uncover the rhetorical strategies applied by supporters of the English for the Children organization during the 2000 Arizona Proposition 203 campaign. The data were from three sources: (a) The Arizona Republic; (b) the East Valley Tribune; and (c) the 2000 Arizona Voter Information Pamphlet. Grounded in Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough & Wodak 1997; Johnstone 2002; Schiffrin 2002), Santa Ana’s (2002) metaphor analysis framework was applied to expose the metaphors used to denigrate bilingual education and those who support it, as well as the underlying ideology behind biased legislation like Proposition 203. Metaphors were analyzed in terms of the cognitive entailments produced by their source and target domains. In general, the overall debate between bilingual education and Proposition 203 was characterized as a WAR. The results show that extra emphasis was placed on portraying bilingual education as a FAILURE and situating minority-language students as VICTIMS. Conversely, English was enshrined in the media as the key to the “American Dream.” This work exemplifies the analytical power of critical discourse analysis by illustrating how language is utilized as a tool for political ends.

After the victory over the Tamil militants in May 2009, the editorials almost backgrounded the significance of resolving the conflict politically and started commenting on the positive dimensions of the victory over terrorism, especially economic development and the outcomes of the provincial, parliamentary and presidential elections and resettlement and rehabilitation. All the editorials constructed a situation that economic development of the country is the real solution to the ethnic conflict.

In the metaphors, scripts and frames of the International Intervention in the peace process as a powerful and paternalist force, there are two binaries: (1) Pressure on the LTTE versus on the Government and (2) the Good versus the Evil. They project US as the angels and THEM as the demons, the international community/USA as teachers, as rescuers and saviors, as paternalist and sponsor, as the Almighty and Omnipotent and as the World hegemon and world policeman, as the insurer, and as the crusaders of democracy. The ethnic conflict resolution is metaphorized as the white man burden. The ideological and attitudinal positions behind these metaphorical projections are that the intervention is accused as international conspiracy and hegemonic interference, the intervention is preferred to be dominantly a War on Terrorism and Norway, the facilitator, is criticized as the proxy of the USA.

Metaphorical Framing Analysis is an apt tool in discourse analysis. Ross (2002) used it in the study on ‘An American Frame: New York Times Editorial Discourse on Palestine and Israel’. This research examines the editorical framing of international violence and terrorism through its commentary about Palestinian/Israeli conflict before and after this “critical discourse moment (Sep 11 Attack)”. The present study owes much to Ross’ analysis to study the possible effects of major news events upon newspaper framing. Gamson (1992) has called them as the cataclysmic events that tend to galvanize public attention. It examines the interaction between news discourse and the construction and negotiation of public discourse about issues. The present study attends to the discursive strategy of the binary positions extended to trifurcated classification that categorizes conflict as "yours, mine, or ours" in this framing analysis.

In the metaphors, scripts and frames of the Intervention as Inappropriate Intrusion, there are four binaries: (1) Intervention versus interference, (2) Pro-LTTE versus Pro-GoSL, (3) Terrorism versus democracy and (4) Internationalization versus intra-nationalization. They project the intervening countries and international Non-governmental Organizations as dictators and ‘our Johnnies who come lately into foreign affairs’, as teachers, as intriguers plotting with the LTTE, as aliens indifferent and ignorant and as stealthy cats. Norway’s cool weather is compared to that of the Wanni as hot. Norway is fish trapped on the hook. These countries are ‘too many cooks triing the conflict soup’. They are metaphorized as a sleeping, inactive persons, as mercenaries wedded to the LTTE, as adding flavor to the conflict resolution cooking, as bidders in the auction, as the development wizards and their promises as illusive mirage, as critics of the media and of the critics of the terrorists’ and as pilgrims of peace. The ideological and attitudinal positions behind these metaphorical projections are that the LTTE and the aspirations of the Tamils, the international community as the guarantors. The development assistance is projected as bonanza and as water flowing. The ideological and attitudinal positions behind these metaphorical projections are that the Sri Lankan and international...
community relations should be seen as the pressure of the international community on the LTTE, the international community should control only the LTTE not the government forces, and the development aid should be so generous without any serious conditions on the ethnic conflict resolution.

In the metaphors, scripts and frames of the India’s Intervention as Invasion and Hegemony, there are four binaries: (1) interference versus intervention, (2) historical causes versus ahistorical causes, (3) Indian versus Sri Lankan security and (4) the Tamil minority community treachery versus the Sinhala Majority community innocence in the Rajiv Assassination. They project Sri Lanka as India’s backyard and as India’s servant. The Sinhala majority community is projected as innocent to India and the Tamil minority community as treacherous to India. India and Indian intervention are portrayed as Machiavellian and the Research and Analysis Wing (the Indian Intelligence) as the evil designer. India’s intervention in 1987 is projected as invasion. India was ‘the repenting mother’ and the Tamil militancy as her troublesome child. India’s international relation is figured as playing games and India as a regional policeman. The ideological and attitudinal positions behind these metaphorical projections are that Indian intervention is considered as hegemonic interference and seen as unstable and disastrous.

The media exploit the inter-textual and interpersonal functions of discourse to make persuasive statements about the ethnic conflict and peace contextualized and co-textualized in the scripts of “war against terrorism”, “global security”, “New World Order,” “national security and sovereignty”. ‘The International Community’s double standard’ is constructed through these grand narratives. The International Community’s sympathy towards the Tamil community and their contacts with the Tamil leadership, were seen as internationalization of the conflict and supporting terrorism and separatism. These relations were hinted as creating ‘many problems’. The Tamils’ political struggle can be easily solved once ‘the terrorism’ is suppressed – the major obstacle for reaching a solution – whereas the problem of party rivalry and absence of southern consensus are neglected.

Ross and Bantimaroudis (2006) researched on ‘Frame Shifts and Catastrophic Events: The Attacks of September 11, 2001, and New York Times’s Portrayals of Arafat and Sharon’. It is a Quantitative content analysis of the editorials and news coverage of the leaders of Israel and the Palestinian territories in The New York Times for one year. The present study is also interested in the frames of ‘global war on terrorism’ developed after this event. It examines the hypothesis that following major global events, such as the September 11 attacks, media frames of distinct, yet thematically related coverage shift to rally around the government elite frame. Evidence partially supports frame shifting but indicates that frames also become more diverse rather than echo dominant views.

The editorials de-legitimize the power of the international community over Sri Lanka within aggressor versus victim frame. They always legitimize the positions of the Sinhala community and de-legitimize those of the Tamil community. The ethno-nationalist extremism and its intransigence in denial of devolving power are backgrounded. They gloat on the illusive scripts and frames of globalization and national security and exploit these universal terms of abstraction. Thus the media pay less attention to the violations of human rights of the minorities at the national level.

Stability and security of the states and regions under the pretext of the global and regional commitments of India and USA are presented through the use of Deliberative future-oriented rhetoric. Thus the International Relations are foregrounded disregarding the intra-national relations. Globalization and political liberalism can be a cover-up for discrimination at the intra-state level for pursuing ethno-nationalist governance and lopsided foreign policy interests. So the present-oriented epidemic (ceremonial) rhetoric is developed to support suppressing terrorism and violence. The past-oriented judicial (forensic) rhetoric is used in balancing the dominant community-induced political causes of the conflict: (1) the invasions of the Tamils from South India from the ancient period; 2) the assistance and support of India in the 80s; 3) the west’s support to the Tamil community and the militants till now.

In their persuasive strategy with the rhetoric elements of logos, ethos, and pathos, the use of emotional appeals shows the negative impacts of the struggle and stresses the need for economic development. Ethical proofs are developed to contain terrorism which serves the political interests of Sri Lanka. Logical reasoning and proofs retain the unitary nature of Sri Lanka by integrating the political and economic interests in the international relations. Economic globalization (political globalization) in Sri Lanka implicates the International Community in the conflict in the name of safeguarding their investment interests so that the political governance and sovereignty of Sri Lanka can be ‘insured’ in these power blocs.

Thus, as the literature review of the past researches revealed, an important characteristic of ideological discourse is its reliance on binary language. For example, according to Said (1978), the ideology, Orientalism, is a dichotomous Western worldview based on an ontological and epistemological distinction (p. 2) between the so-called Orient and the West. In addition to using a dichotomous language, ideological construction uses an essentialist discourse, universalizing certain traits and characteristics (ibid.).

8. Conclusion

The basic assumption of the research problem has been established: the metaphorical editorial discourse constructions (of journalists and editors of the Sri Lankan elite media) hide or express their ideological and attitudinal positions in subtle and mild forms. The media’s failure in distinguishing “Sinhala people” from “Sri Lankan people” has alienated the minority communities to lose confidence in media’s contribution to nation-building. Both the Sinhala and Tamil Press have played a negative role in sharpening the ethnic discourse. The discourse generally lacks the well-known (obligatory) Resolution category (Gamson, 1992). The minority groups and the International Community are assumed to create all kinds of problems for the majority. The ideological value structure of such editorials emphasizes order,
authority, and control: the Tamil community should be obedient, patriotic, and loyal, and if they do not obey the law, then they will have to suffer the ‘inevitable actions’ of the radical Sinhala nationalists. The editorials reveal the ‘intent and content’, ‘insular and secular’ approaches, and ‘commands and demands’ of the dominant community.

The findings are the result of an analysis of a particular genre in its time and space. Therefore, this study claims that since the genre of the editorial is dynamic and always in flux due to the change in the contexts, especially the editorial committees, the Sri Lankan English newspaper editorial discourse may have different positions in future. Hence, these findings need not be construed as fixed positions. The changing current political circumstances in this post-war, development-focused scenario may positively or negatively influence the ideological and attitudinal positions of the media elites in Sri Lanka. This work has challenged long-held beliefs about the media’s engagement in constructing a positive atmosphere, especially amidst the intensive emotional and ideological historical conflict. The media seem to be inadequate in revealing the forces underlying ethnic violence in the context of political and economic dynamics of globalization.

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Reference


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Appendix: The editorials specifically analyzed with quotations

Barking up the wrong tree! (2006 May 09) The Island
Bartering away sovereignty for a mess of pottage. (2005 Apr 05) The Island
Blake, Blake burning bright. (2006: Sep 21) The Island
Caught in headman’s backyard. 2006 Aug 24 The Island
Claymore carnival continue. (2006 Apr 23) The Island
Co-chairs as preachers. (2006 Nov 24) The Island
Co-chairs as a scarecrow. (2006 Jan 09) The Island
Doomed are the peace makers! (2006 Aug 14)The Island
Eagles, hawks, extremists and nukes. (2006 Oct 09) The Island
EU ban: Bauer does a Kekille (2006 Aug 22) The Island
Exchanging the devil for the rascal? (2005 Sep 04) The Sunday Times
Failed monitors as tutors. (2005 Apr 11) The Island
Feline protests, crab walks and some questions. (2006 Nov 27) The Island
Fishing in tidal waves.(2005 Jan 12) The Island
Ghosts Ahoy! (2006 Jan 10) the Island
Glory and Warts of Peace. (2002 Feb 23) The Island
Going Nowhere. (2004 Dec 05) The Sunday Leader
Harrold clawing Lanka’s sovereignty.(2005 Mar 07) The Island
India’s interests and our freedom. 2004 May 06 The Daily Mirror
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